2026-05-13

Amendments Nos. 1 and 4 are grouped together.

I move amendment No. 1: In page 4, between lines 7 and 8, to insert the following: “ ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the acts specified in Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court; ‘genocide’ means any of the acts specified in Article 6 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court; ‘war crime’ means any of the acts specified in Article 8.2 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.”. Amendment No. 1 inserts these definitions. Amendment No. 4, which is a substantive amendment, reads: Prohibition on procurement or use of certain technologies 43DA.(1) An Garda Síochána, the Minister, or any public body acting on their behalf shall not procure, license, contract for, deploy, or otherwise make operational use of any biometric analysis technology, surveillance technology, software, hardware, dataset, or related service supplied by— (a) a company incorporated, headquartered, or substantially operating in a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, (b) a subsidiary, affiliate, or parent undertaking of such a company, or (c) any entity that develops, trains, sources, or operates biometric or surveillance systems using data, infrastructure, or technology originating a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. (2) For the purposes of this section, ‘surveillance technology’ includes any system capable of biometric analysis, facial recognition, behavioural categorisation, pattern of life analysis, or the processing of biometric data within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 2018. (3) Any existing contract, memorandum of understanding, or procurement arrangement that contravenes subsection (1) shall not be renewed, extended, or varied, and shall be terminated at the earliest date ... (4) Nothing in this section shall prevent the Minister from authorising the temporary retention of data or equipment solely for the purpose of evidential preservation ... (5) No biometric data collected, processed, or retained under this Act shall be transferred to, processed by, or stored on any server, cloud service, or technological infrastructure— (a) located in a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. (b) controlled by an entity referred to in subsection (1), or (c) operated using software, firmware, or backend systems originating in a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.” The reason for these amendments is that banning the use of technology from states engaged in war crimes and genocide should not even be up for debate. It should be an absolute given. We know that An Garda Síochána has used and is probably still using surveillance technology originating from the State of Israel. The record of Israel is highly problematic from both a national security perspective and because it is supporting a genocidal regime that uses this very technology to target Palestinians. In 2023, for example, An Garda Síochána paid €278,000 to Cognyte, an Israeli surveillance technology company. Its main product is an investigative analytics platform that uses AI, facial recognition and data aggregation to analyse communications, CCTV, social media and much more. The company has a really controversial history. Its tools have been used in Indonesia to monitor LGBT and religious minorities. They have been used in Myanmar and South Sudan for mass interception. A Brazilian investigation alleges that the Cognyte system was used under the Bolsonaro regime to track political opponents. The Minister, Deputy O'Callaghan, cannot guarantee at present that this company's tools would not be used for the provisions under the recording devices Bill that we are discussing. We also know that the Garda has paid hundreds of thousands of euro to an Israeli cyberdefence company that has worked with Israeli authorities to target Palestinians during the current genocide in Palestine. That company, Cellebrite, has deep links to the Israeli military and intelligence and has previously been criticised by many international groups for selling its technology to repressive governments. This company has been used by Israel to target Palestinians throughout the current genocide in Gaza. In 2021 alone, the Garda spent over €200,000 on that company's services. While it is important that gardaí have access to technology, including the deception technology required to detect and prosecute serious crimes, alternatives have to be found to using companies from states that are engaged in war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity. Without enshrining this in law, I do not believe that will happen. The experience to date says it will not happen. In 2024, the Government banned future purchases of military equipment from Israel due to the actions of the Israeli Government in Gaza, but this ban did not apply to An Garda Síochána. The acceptance of these amendments would mirror and be wholly consistent with the position that the Government has taken with respect to the purchase of military equipment by the Defence Forces. It would also be important - I want to stress this - that from a national security perspective, it would make absolutely no sense to procure this type of technology from a state that has been quite blatantly hostile to Ireland simply because this State has stood up against the crime of genocide that is occurring in Gaza. I encourage and implore the Minister to accept amendments Nos. 1 and 4 so that we can enshrine their provisions in this legislation and ensure that we provide new powers to the Garda to procure equipment that will have very extensive capabilities while at the same time not assisting what is now by definition a rogue state.

I thank Deputy Carthy for these two amendments. We had an opportunity on Committee Stage to have a discussion on these amendments as well, but the Deputy is perfectly entitled to submit them again. As the Leas-Ceann Comhairle will be aware, the purpose of this legislation is to provide a facility for An Garda Síochána to engage in retrospective biometric analysis in terms of the work that it does and in terms of trying to speed up investigations for the purpose of identifying missing persons or locating individuals in a crowd when there is a large amount of CCTV footage. That is the primary purpose of this legislation. What the Deputy is seeking to do is to put into primary legislation rules on procurement. In particular, he wants to rule out An Garda Síochána entering into contracts with certain companies that are based in countries that have been adjudicated to have been involved in crimes against humanity or genocide. As I have said previously, however, procurement is governed by EU rules and national regulations and my view today is the same as it was when this matter came before us on Committee Stage, in that it would be inappropriate to duplicate these restrictions in primary legislation. There are mandatory exclusion grounds where a tenderer has been convicted of one or more of the following offences: participation in a criminal organisation; corruption; fraud; terrorist offences or offences linked to terrorist activities; money laundering or terrorist financing; child labour; human trafficking-related offences; and the breach of tax or social security obligations. Public procurement rules and regulations provide for a transparent, non-discriminatory process and there are sufficient rules and regulations in place in respect of existing guidelines. Procurement matters generally would not be a matter to be addressed in this Bill. In the case of any procurement of biometric technologies, there are requirements for providers and deployers of AI systems under the AI Act and An Garda Síochána will look to its European counterparts when engaging in the procurement process for best practice in the area. I am satisfied that the Garda will seek to advance ethical considerations when it comes to procurement processes as well. Deputy Carthy is seeking to target Israel because of the war crimes committed by it in Gaza and elsewhere. I agree with him when he says that this State, through its Government, has stood up to the criminal genocide in Gaza. That is correct. Obviously, it has resulted in Israel having a negative view of Ireland on the basis that we are standing up for what we believe is a rules-based international system and ensuring we have an orderly resolution of disputes. Nonetheless, having said that, it would be inappropriate to include rules in respect of procurement in primary legislation. For that reason, I am adopting the same position as I did on Committee Stage, which is that I cannot accept these amendments.

The difficulty is that we know An Garda Síochána has purchased this type of equipment from companies that have close relationships with the Israeli regime. The current legal position is that this can continue. The Minister mentioned that we did not need to put this in primary legislation, but since Committee Stage up to now, I do not understand why the Minister did not cut this off at the pass by introducing these types of provision by regulation, as has been the case in respect of the Defence Forces. The Minister should answer to the House as to why he has not done that. In the absence of such a move, the only inference that can be taken is that there must be at least the interest in keeping the option of the Garda using companies that are engaged and collaborating in a genocide for the purpose of purchasing material that will ultimately be used to carry out biometric recognition in respect of Irish citizens. That is deeply concerning. For that reason, this House should put on the record where it stands on this issue. This will come back to bite the Government if it does not accept this amendment or bring forward the regulations that would provide the comfort. This is not just in respect of Israel. It is in respect of Russia and any other state that is engaged in activities that are declared by the International Criminal Court, ICC, to be either genocide or war crimes.

As Deputy Carthy will be aware, under section 3 of the 2023 Act, there is a provision that enables me to make regulations in respect of provisions contained within the legislation. Obviously, I cannot make regulations now in respect of an amendment that is not yet part of the legislation. Nonetheless, I am aware of the powers that I have under section 3. It is a matter that I will give consideration to, but we need to recognise that there are rules in place to deal with procurement. It is not appropriate to put this into primary legislation, such as the legislation we are dealing with here about the ability of An Garda Síochána to use biometric retrospective analysis. It would be inappropriate in that legislation to put in a provision that talks about with whom An Garda Síochána may enter into contracts. I am aware of the point being made by Deputy Carthy and I am aware of the powers I have under section 3.

We are dealing with a Bill that would, for the first time, allow what we all hope would be the appropriate use of biometric recognition technology in order to assist our police force in tackling serious crime, security matters and missing persons cases. Most people in the House recognise that, for those serious issues, there is a need for the use of that type of technology. However, there is also a consensus that we have to ensure appropriate safeguards because we have seen how this type of technology has been abused internationally. A number of states have used this type of technology for aggressive reasons. They have used it to either spy on their own citizenry on an ongoing basis or pursue war crimes and breaches of international law. To be clear, with this amendment, we are just putting in one of the necessary safeguards to ensure that we do not allow technology to be supplied by companies that collaborate with states engaged in war crimes or genocide. As I said at the outset, that should not even be up for debate. I thought the Minister would have welcomed and adopted that. My real concern is that while the Minister has said, as he did on Committee Stage, that this is something he will give consideration to by way of regulation, he has not assured this House that he will be pursuing that route. It is for those reasons that I will be pressing the amendment.

I move amendment No. 2: In page 6, after line 40, to insert the following: “(3A) A member of An Garda Síochána shall not deploy biometric analysis unless authorised in advance by a member of An Garda Síochána not below the rank of Chief Superintendent, who shall record in writing the grounds of necessity and proportionality for such deployment.”. This amendment was discussed on Committee Stage. It seeks to ensure that there are safeguards in terms of how this technology can be used and, crucially, to ensure that there is no overreach, by ensuring that the deployment of biometric analysis or facial recognition must be authorised in advance by a garda not below the rank of chief superintendent. As I said during the previous discussions on this Bill, we know that gardaí have faced disciplinary processes for misuse of the PULSE system in the past, for example. There was one particularly horrendous case in which a former garda was ultimately jailed for inciting strangers to rape a colleague. That type of situation is in the minority. It is something that does not happen and we would not expect to happen. The individual pleaded guilty to the unauthorised disclosure of Garda PULSE personal data on 14 different individuals. While it is important to say, as I mentioned, that such misuses would only ever relate to a very tiny minority, it does point to a misuse of the PULSE system and, in my view, reinforces the need to ensure we have proper protections in place to ensure that when we are adopting new technologies that they are only used when appropriate, that they are properly authorised and that they are absolutely necessary for the investigation of serious crimes or missing persons or matters of that nature. It is appropriate that we would set an appropriate level of Garda rank who could authorise that and in my view the authorisation should come from a chief superintendent or above.

I will be supporting this amendment and a similar one tabled by Deputy Kelly. We all appreciate that An Garda needs tools to investigate serious crime, find missing people of people and protect the public. Nobody on this side of the House will ever dispute that. However, our job is to make sure that when we hand these tools over we do so in a way that is legally sound. The Bill introduces a new concept of biometric analysis which is defined across three limbs in section 43A. The first allows gardaí to automatically recognise and categorise physical features of individuals generally from footage gathered in an investigation. The second allows them to track particular unidentified persons across that footage. The third allows them to locate particular identified persons using the same process. The Bill carefully avoids using the language of the EU AI Act, but the EU AI Act does not care what we call things; it cares what we do. What these powers do - in particular the first limb - is categorise people on the basis of their biometric data, namely, skin colour, hair colour, eye colour and body shape. By any plain reading, that is a biometric categorisation within the meaning of the AI Act. The AI Act is not aspirational. Rather, it is binding and it is explicit that biometric categorisation systems used by law enforcement are classified as high-risk AI systems. This classification carries with it a suite of mandatory obligations under Articles 26 and 27. These are obligations on the deployer, which in this case is An Garda Síochána. Those obligations include: ensuring human oversight by personnel with the necessary skills, training and authority; monitoring the system for risks to fundamental rights; suspending use of the system if such a risk arises; maintaining logs for a minimum of six months and carrying out a data protection impact assessment and, under Article 27, conducting a detailed fundamental rights impact assessment before deploying the system and sharing results with the market surveillance authority. I did raise this on Committee Stage and I was told that the code of practice would deal with it. I want to gently but firmly push back on that. A code of practice prepared by the Garda Commissioner and reviewed every five years is not an adequate substitute for statutory obligations enshrined in primary legislation.

I thank Deputy Carthy for his amendment and Deputy Gannon for his contribution. As I said at the outset, the purpose of this legislation is to provide an additional tool to An Garda Síochána in order to expedite its investigations. This is not a tool that will be used for the purpose of putting evidence before a court to convict a person of a criminal offence. It is an instrument that will be of benefit to gardaí when they are going through very significant amounts of CCTV footage. As I said previously on Committee Stage, this amendment would, in my opinion, make the system incapable of effective operation. As I said, the gardaí will be assisted by this provision in sorting and filtering data in order that a human reviewer can narrow down avenues of investigation. Let us take an example of where biometric analysis will be of considerable assistance to An Garda Síochána. This is in investigations of child sexual abuse material. As an aside, I should say that earlier today I was at the launch of the annual report of the Irish Internet Hotline. It is an excellent report, but it does reveal the extent to which child sexual abuse material is being derived, accessed and used by people in Ireland. It is something we need to be constantly vigilant about and ensure that we have a very strong ability within An Garda Síochána to investigate it and prosecute it. If we take the example of a child sexual abuse material investigation, there could be thousands of images over which biometric analysis could be performed. If the approach in the amendment were to be adopted, it would require the biometric analysis of each image to be approved by a chief superintendent. We would clearly lose valuable time seeking authorisations. We would lose time identifying vulnerable victims and waste valuable Garda time. I regret to say it would make no operational sense to proceed in the manner proposed by the amendment. Identifiable persons will be responsible for not only reviewing the footage or images, but responsible for any decisions made in the course of an investigation. Biometric analysis could aid investigators by finding all instances of a distinctive facial feature or scar in what can be hundreds of thousands of images or videos on a single seized device. All searching proposed in this Bill is for investigative leads only. It has the potential to group relevant images together, so a person can either review the footage or have a starting point for that review. Inserting an authorisation process for the carrying out of biometric analysis, as is suggested by this amendment, would, in my opinion, be unnecessary. This, as I said, is a decision-support tool with clear safeguards set out in the Bill, including approval by both Houses for a code of practice. Biometric analysis could be used to search for general biometric characteristics for an unidentified victim, a suspect, a person who is a threat to the security of the State or indeed a missing person. However, there are also conditions that must be met in order for those searches to be permitted and these include that it has to be necessary and proportionate in the context of a specific criminal investigation into serious offences, offences which have penalties of five years or more, a matter relating to national security, or in a missing person investigation. It can also only be used on documents gathered in the context of that investigation. An authorisation does need to be reserved for the most intrusive use in cases. The Bill is about using technology to aid investigative work, not to replace it. For those reasons, I cannot accept Deputy Carthy's amendment. I note what Deputy Gannon said in respect of the EU AI Act. I want to emphasise again that the Bill will be in line with EU law. The Commission guidelines for high-risk AI systems are still in drafting and have been reviewed by member states with feedback provided. These will include a list of practical examples of use cases of AI systems that are high risk or not high risk. While the guidelines will act as an interpretive tool in understanding how to implement the AI Act, the European Court of Justice will be the ultimate arbiter of the AI Act and its provisions.

I should say that we are not raising these issues to obstruct. We are raising the issues because there is the potential for quite clear legal vulnerabilities here. The Bill, as it is presented to us and as we can see before us, has brought suggestions from some organisations that there are some violations of the AI Act and EU regulations. We can only scrutinise what is in front of us as it is presented to us. With regard to the use of this technology, particularly in some of the cases the Minister outlined of the most serious nature where we want prosecution if a person is found to be guilty, we do not want to leave legal loopholes that people can use to remove themselves from prosecution because the tools that have been used by the State to establish guilt are being seen as a breach of an EU law. That is the vulnerability I am highlighting. I am not sure from the Minister's answer if that will be addressed in the legislation that actually gives confidence to what we are doing here today.

I am not entirely reassured by the Minister's assurances. He talks about a code of practice which this House will have no hand, act or part in developing. His own Department and his office, in particular, since he has taken office have been incredibly reluctant to provide information to the Members of this House on how decisions are made or how matters relating to the outworkings of legislation actually work in practice. I would have thought this would be a fairly standard safeguard to ensure the public could be assured that, before this type of technology is utilised, it is actually approved by a senior garda. The question then is at which rank that should be. We have indicated in this amendment that it should be chief superintendent. I think that is eminently reasonable. To talk about a code of practice that may or may not have adequate or even stronger safeguards ultimately does not provide the assurances this House should have before we pass legislation that will, ultimately, convey substantial new powers to An Garda Síochána.

I just want to clarify. I am certainly not suggesting that any of the Deputies here are highlighting issues for the purpose of obstructing the legislation or, indeed, trying to obstruct the work of An Garda Síochána. Deputies are highlighting issues that are of concern to them. Similarly, however, in responding to them I have to be able to say be able to say how I think in practice the amendment, if enacted, would impact An Garda Síochána. My view is that if this amendment was enacted, it would have a very negative operational impact on the force because of the fact that we are dealing with images that can come in bundles of hundreds or thousands. If we are going to have a chief superintendent who has to authorise each one of them before biometric analysis can take place, that is going to have a very limiting impact on the work of the Garda. In fact, the likelihood is that it will just become a paper-signing exercise or a box-ticking exercise and it would undermine the whole purpose of the real measures that are going to be put in place to ensure there is proper oversight. Deputy Carthy said he did not gain much confidence from the code of practice. He should reserve his comments in respect of that because a code of practice setting out procedures surrounding the use of retrospective biometric analysis will be laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas. It will be subject to debate and resolutions being passed. It will be published as a statutory instrument, making it a publicly available document. Human rights and data protection impact assessments will be required as part of the procedure for drafting a code of practice. In respect of the code, the Garda Commissioner, as is the case with the current codes of practice under the principal Act, will have to consult with several bodies listed in section 47A, which is to be inserted by section 10 in this Bill, and publish the code for views prior to adoption. There is, therefore, a whole statutory mechanism to ensure there is oversight and engagement in respect of the finalisation of those codes of practice. Where gardaí are deploying a high-risk AI system, there will be criteria to be fulfilled more generally under the AI Act for deployers, as I mentioned earlier, and the providers of systems will also have to fulfil certain criteria. Notwithstanding this, the Data Protection Acts will continue to apply, as set out in section 4 of the principal Act. There is also oversight whereby a High Court judge will be required to report to the Taoiseach annually on the code. There is a huge amount of oversight there. I believe it is sufficient to ensure there is public confidence in the work that is being done by An Garda Síochána should this provision be enacted. I have to say, however, that I remain opposed to the amendment we are discussing now because I think it would have a very negative impact operationally on the work of An Garda Síochána.

I will make a couple of comments in conclusion. The Minister knows full well that nobody is suggesting that there would be individual authorisation for every single image, for every still and video. The amendment does not suggest that at all. It states that it would be authorised in advance by a chief superintendent or higher and that there would be a written record of the grounds for necessity and proportionality. That would negate the suggestion that this would become just a rubber-stamping exercise. The amendment is eminently sensible in my view.

I move amendment No. 3: In page 8, between lines 12 and 13, to insert the following: “Processing and storage of data 43DA.Biometric data processed under this Act shall— (a) be retained only for the minimum period strictly necessary, (b) be stored and processed exclusively on servers located within the European Union, (c) not be accessible to private contractors, and (d) be deleted immediately once no longer required for the purpose for which it was collected.”. This amendment is about ensuring that there can be full public confidence. I think there is broad recognition that this type of technology will become an important and useful mechanism to An Garda in its work of tackling serious crime, dealing with security matters and particularly, hopefully, in respect of missing person cases. I will state again, however, that the public will want to be assured that there are safeguards in terms of how and when this technology will be used. This amendment seeks to ensure that we have full protection in terms of where the data is processed and stored and to ensure that such data is only stored for the necessary period. As we permit the use of this kind of technology in assisting gardaí to do their job of detecting crime and catching criminals, we also need to ensure there are safeguards in terms of what is being processed and for how long it is being held. That is what this amendment simply does. I believe it is important because without this type of amendment there is going to be some public concern about the deployment of this type of technology. This amendment is a way of negating that in a way that does not disrupt the intention of the Bill.

I thank Deputy Carthy for this amendment. As the subheading to it indicates, it is a processing amendment. I want to point out, however, that a processing provision is already provided for and the wording proposed for this section will be governed by the code of practice. The provisions of the recording devices Act are without prejudice to the requirements of the Data Protection Acts. The general principles of data protection are set out in those Acts and the processing of data, including access, retention, storage, deletion or destruction of data, will be supplemented by the code of practice. I ask Deputy Carthy to look at section 47A, which is on page ten of the Bill and, in particular, subsections (2) and (3) of that section. Subsection (2) states: [the] draft code of practice shall include provisions relating to- [...] (b) parameters for use of biometric analysis, including geographical and, subject to section 43C(7), temporal limits of such use, (c) the confidentiality, security, storage, access, retention, erasure and destruction of data obtained as a result of the operation of Part 6A, It specifically includes, in subsection (2), reference to data, and also subsection (3)(b) refers to "different types of biometric data and biometric analysis", and "different categories of persons or data (including biometric data)". The issue is referred to and covered already in the Bill. There is, as I say, a provision there regarding the destruction or deletion of data where it does not result in the recognition or categorisation of a person. I also emphasise that the power provided for in this Bill is for An Garda Síochána only.

I move amendment No. 4: In page 8, between lines 12 and 13, to insert the following: "Prohibition on procurement or use of certain technologies 43DA.(1) An Garda Síochána, the Minister, or any public body acting on their behalf shall not procure, license, contract for, deploy, or otherwise make operational use of any biometric analysis technology, surveillance technology, software, hardware, dataset, or related service supplied by— (a) a company incorporated, headquartered, or substantially operating in a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, (b) a subsidiary, affiliate, or parent undertaking of such a company, or (c) any entity that develops, trains, sources, or operates biometric or surveillance systems using data, infrastructure, or technology originating a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. (2) For the purposes of this section, 'surveillance technology' includes any system capable of biometric analysis, facial recognition, behavioural categorisation, pattern of life analysis, or the processing of biometric data within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 2018. (3) Any existing contract, memorandum of understanding, or procurement arrangement that contravenes subsection (1) shall not be renewed, extended, or varied, and shall be terminated at the earliest date permissible under contract law. (4) Nothing in this section shall prevent the Minister from authorising the temporary retention of data or equipment solely for the purpose of evidential preservation, forensic examination, or legal compliance, provided that no further operational use is made of such technology. (5) No biometric data collected, processed, or retained under this Act shall be transferred to, processed by, or stored on any server, cloud service, or technological infrastructure— (a) located in a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. (b) controlled by an entity referred to in subsection (1), or (c) operated using software, firmware, or backend systems originating in a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.".

I move amendment No. 5: In page 8, between lines 15 and 16, to insert the following: “(ab) contravenes section 43C(1);”. The Bill is drafted on the basis that what is not permitted remains prohibited. Checking a person's image against a database of images seems to remain prohibited. It seems the only way to emphasise this is to make it an offence. The Bill already criminalises falsifying, concealing or destroying information obtained by biometric analysis. It does not, however, state that a contravention of the Bill itself is an offence. The purpose of this amendment to make it an offence without lawful authority or reasonable excuse knowingly to contravene section 43C(1), which states: "A member of Garda personnel shall not carry out biometric analysis other than in accordance with this Part and any applicable code of practice." The last time we spoke on this, the Minister said he would look at it and consider it. I await his response.

I did look at it and I am opposed to the amendment for the following reason. I am conscious that the Deputy wants to make it a criminal offence if a garda should access or use biometric analysis other than in accordance with the legislation. That would mean that a garda could be prosecuted in circumstances where the mistake was inadvertent or where something was done which did not reach the culpable level that would merit a criminal prosecution. Like the Deputy, I do not want to see gardaí unnecessarily or unfairly prosecuted. If this provision was included in the Act, there would be a requirement on the DPP or whoever is investigating it to say there is a breach of the Act because even if it was an inadvertent breach of the rules in respect of biometric analysis, there was nonetheless a breach of the rules. The offence provision follows on from what is set out in principal Act and focuses on the falsification, concealment, destruction or unauthorised disposal of information. These are offences that could have significant consequences for people if information were destroyed or concealed. That is what is criminalised in the proposed legislation at present. The Deputy's amendment would ensure that any inadvertent use would be subject to criminal penalties when it would be far more appropriate that such activity be considered in a disciplinary context and by the various authorities that oversee An Garda Síochána. I understand the intention of the amendment, but I do not see that making Garda personnel subject to an offence for inadvertent use is good policy here. As a result, I cannot accept the amendment.

I will not press the amendment. I accept the Minister's response. This is something that may need to be narrowed down and looked at. Something that is inadvertent would, by and large, be acceptable, but something that is deliberate would not. This may be a matter that we can return to at a later stage. On the basis of the Minister’s reply, I will not press the amendment.

I move amendment No. 6: In page 9, between lines 36 and 37, to insert the following: “10.The Minister shall ensure that no national deployment of biometric categorisation technologies shall occur until a pilot programme has been completed and independently evaluated, including assessments of— (a) accuracy and error rates, (b) discriminatory impacts, (c) compliance with data protection law, and (d) impacts on privacy and fundamental rights, and the evaluation shall be laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas.”. The amendment follows on from the roll-out of other technology used by gardaí, including body cameras. It would be eminently sensible that, prior to the full deployment of new technology, we would have a pilot programme. Such a programme would ensure that we end up with technology that is accurate and effective and that any issues which need to be identified are identified at an early stage and can be addressed prior to the wider roll-out.

I thank Deputy Carthy for his amendment. As he indicated, he wants to put into legislation that a pilot programme should be carried out before biometric analysis is commenced by An Garda Síochána. As I mentioned on Committee Stage, the putting in place of a pilot scheme for the roll-out of any new technology is an operational matter for the Garda Commissioner and is not appropriate to this Bill. For instance, regarding the use of body cameras, which Deputy Carthy mentioned, or the use of Tasers, the Commissioner has introduced them through the use of a pilot project. That type of technology is used operationally on the ground by An Garda Síochána in communities. Gardaí have not yet procured this type of technology. Accuracy will be a decisive factor in any decision made. As I mentioned previously, gardaí will look to their European counterparts during the procurement process because these types of tools are in use in other EU states. The code of practice procedure already requires the Commissioner to conduct data protection and human rights impact assessments before the deployment of any technology. Therefore, I do not think a pilot programme, whether it is necessary or not, should be put into primary legislation. For that reason, I cannot support the amendment.

Amendments Nos. 7 to 9, inclusive, are related and may be discussed together, by agreement. Is that agreed? Agreed.

I move amendment No. 7: In page 10, between lines 16 and 17, to insert the following: “(ba) clear and specific limits on the circumstances in which biometric analysis or biometric categorisation may be used, including prohibitions on use for general surveillance, population level monitoring, or speculative searches, (bb) objective thresholds and evidential standards that must be met before any biometric analysis may be initiated, (bc) safeguards to prevent disproportionate or discriminatory impacts, including mandatory risk assessment procedures, (bd) technical and operational parameters governing accuracy, reliability, and error rate thresholds, and (be) mandatory documentation, authorisation procedures and audit trails to ensure accountability and prevent misuse,”. Amendment No. 8 proposes to insert the following into the Bill: In page 11, between lines 22 and 23, to insert the following: “(5A) When making an order under subsection (5), the Minister shall lay the code of practice, together with an explanatory memorandum outlining the safeguards, limitations and parameters governing the use of biometric analysis and biometric categorisation, before each House of the Oireachtas.”. With respect to amendment No. 7, in response to a previous amendment, we heard the Minister cite the code of practice. Much is left to the code of practice regarding the potential concerns that people have, but there is no real clarification as to what the parameters of the code of practice will be. Therefore, it is important that we have some detail on the safeguards, data limits, oversight and practical uses within the overarching legislation. The section on the code of practice gives far too much discretion to the Garda Commissioner, who drafts, amends and controls the consultation process relating to the codes that regulate Garda powers. Safeguards are not fixed in the legislation, which leaves crucial questions unanswered. The additions in amendment No. 7 would strengthen the requirements in relation to the code of practice by requiring strict limits, objective evidential thresholds, anti-discrimination safeguards, technical accuracy safeguards and full authorisation, thereby ensuring that biometric powers would remain properly controlled and that there would be transparency and accountability. Amendment No. 8 is complementary to Committee Stage amendment No. 16. It proposes a requirement that the code of practice be laid before the Dáil and deals with the safeguards to which I referred earlier. With regard to the first review of the code of practice, amendment No. 9 suggests a change from five years to two. After the initial review, five years is fine. However, five years is too long to wait for the first review of the code of practice. The amendment is clear and sensible. It does not upset the apple cart. There will be five-year reviews, but the first review should take place after two years. When talking about a new technology, there are, as already discussed, many potential issues that may arise. Unless amendment No. 7 is adopted, the answer to the question as to where the code will end up is very cloudy. It is critical that this House stipulates in legislation that after the first two years, there will be a comprehensive review. The reviews will take place on a five-year basis thereafter, as the legislation currently stipulates.

I thank Deputy Carthy for tabling these three amendments. One of the things that is noticeable when looking at this type of legislation, which involves data, is that there is a huge amount of legislation in place at present outside of the recording devices Act of 2023. I am referring in particular to the Data Protection Acts. Those Acts contain prohibitions on mass surveillance, indiscriminate searches and utilising biometrics. I do not believe amendment No. 7 is necessary because a lot of what it deals with is already prohibited under the Data Protection Acts. It is not good legislative practice to duplicate existing statutory powers. Section 4 of the principal Act notes that the provisions of the recording devices Act are without prejudice to the provisions of the Data Protection Acts 1988 to 2018. This will also apply to Part 6A, which is being inserted by section 10. There is an express provision that states that the recording devices Act is without prejudice to what is in the Data Protection Acts. There are also clear limitations on searching already set out in section 43C. That information must be in the context of, among other things, a specific investigation. As stated, the code of practice provisions already set out what needs to be included in a code. These include provisions relating to procedures, confidentiality, security, storage, access, retention and parameters for use. The code can also set out different provisions in relation to types of biometric data or the circumstances in which biometric analysis can be carried out. As a result, I cannot accept amendment No. 7. Amendment No. 8 is also not considered necessary because section 47A sets out what is to be included in the code of practice. This includes the parameters for the carrying out of biometric analysis. The code of practice for the carrying out of such analysis will be laid before the Houses. This means that the Houses will have the opportunity to scrutinise the code alongside what is required under the provisions in section 47A. In the context of amendment No. 9, Deputy Carthy is proposing to change the initial review period from five years to two years. As I said on Committee Stage, setting this at five years aligns with the principal Act. We can already see how involved the process of drafting a code of practice is. The requirements for assessments and consultation make it a lengthy and detailed process and would further delay the roll-out of what I believe is an essential, necessary digital tool for An Garda. A code may need to be reviewed earlier than the five years and there is nothing preventing this from happening in the Bill. For that reason, I cannot accept the amendment.

I will make a quick point in respect of amendment No. 9. The review will take place after the roll-out. Any delays in the initial roll-out will not affect the review - and that is not suggested or implied in any way - from the enactment of this legislation to the roll-out. The Bill currently states that following the initial roll-out, the review will take place after five years. There is nothing in the Bill to prevent a review taking place earlier. What is critically important for public confidence, however, is that people know that once this legislation is in place, there will be a swift opportunity to analyse its effectiveness. I strongly believe that this would be more appropriately done after two years rather than five.

I move amendment No. 8: In page 11, between lines 22 and 23, to insert the following: “(5A) When making an order under subsection (5), the Minister shall lay the code of practice, together with an explanatory memorandum outlining the safeguards, limitations and parameters governing the use of biometric analysis and biometric categorisation, before each House of the Oireachtas.”.

I move amendment No. 9: In page 11, line 31, to delete “5 years” and substitute “2 years”.

Amendments Nos. 10 and 11 are related and may be discussed together. Amendment No. 11 is a physical alternative to amendment No. 10.

I move amendment No. 10: “11. Section 49 of the Principal Act is amended— (a) by the substitution of the following subsection for subsection (3): “(3) The functions of the designated judge are to— (a) keep under review the operation of Parts 3, 6 and 6A in so far as each of them has come into operation, and (b) report to the Taoiseach from time to time and at least once every 12 months concerning any matters relating to that operation, including the impact of such operation on human rights, that the designated judge considers should be reported.”, and (b) in subsection (6), by the insertion of “or disclose the personal data relating to an individual” after “security of the State”.”. This amendment arises on foot of an amendment tabled by Deputy Kelly on Committee Stage, which, in effect, I am accepting. However, I have rejigged the wording in order to give what the Deputy proposed what we would regard as a more effective meaning in terms of its presentation. I tabled amendment No. 10 having considered the amendment put forward by Deputy Kelly on Committee Stage and again now. His amendment asks that the designated judge consider whether Part 3, which deals with ANPR, or Part 6, which deals with third-party CCTV, or Part 6A, which deals with biometric analysis, operate in a manner calculated to secure "confidence in the impartial performance of policing functions, without disproportionate impact on persons of particular national or ethnic origins". Using the words "national or ethnic origins" would have left it unclear as to how this could be measure for those Parts. That is why the proposal I have come with involves a slight change to Deputy Kelly's wording. We should assess the impact on the human rights of the person. That will allow judges to focus on the operational effect of the Parts relating to human rights, something that will also be assessed by An Garda through the human rights impact assessment during the development of codes of practice for those Parts. I thank Deputy Kelly for bringing forward his amendment. His intention in amendment No. 11 is that the human rights of individuals should be assessed by judges. That is being done, although the only real change is that I have not limited it to the national or ethnic origins. I have adopted a broader approach, but human rights will contemplate someone's national or ethnic origins.

This is a rarity, but I thank the Minister. It is not very often that, in effect, a Minister accepts an amendment from the Opposition, particularly on a Bill that is quite technical. I acknowledge that. Even though this is technically not my amendment, it reflects the spirit of the amendment I tabled. I acknowledge the fact that it is the Labour Party's amendment and my amendment. I do accept what the Minister is saying in relation to how he has constructed a revision of what I put forward and broadened it out to go past the issue of national or ethnic origins and focus on the broader human rights issue. I thank him sincerely for accepting the spirit of the original amendment. It was put forward for the right reason, namely to ensure that people will be protected no matter where they come from or their background. On that basis, I will not move amendment No. 11.