2026-06-16

I move: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time." I am grateful for the opportunity to bring this important Bill before the House. Electronic evidence is now central to almost every criminal investigation. While data flows globally, law enforcement authorities across Europe are often in need of foreign-held evidence for domestic cases, including data held by service providers in this jurisdiction. Electronic data is volatile and can be easily deleted, altered or moved. The emergence of cloud computing, where the exact physical location of data is often dynamic, has brought another set of jurisdictional difficulties for criminal investigations. Existing means of legal co-operation between countries, namely mutual legal assistance, are slow and complex. As a result, law enforcement and judicial authorities often experience difficulties in accessing electronic evidence relevant to an investigation, rendering prosecutions ineffective. Increasingly, law enforcement has become reliant on voluntary co-operation with service providers but this method lacks enforcement power, fails to protect fundamental rights and leaves it up to service providers to determine the legitimacy of requests. It is to address these deficiencies that I am introducing the Criminal Justice (International Cooperation on Electronic Evidence and Other Matters) Bill. The Bill delivers on the programme for Government commitment to implement the EU e-evidence package. That package provides a clear, legally certain and efficient process for law enforcement in one member state to directly request electronic evidence from service providers established in another member state, while protecting fundamental rights. Ireland's role is central to implementation of the e-evidence package. It is expected that up to 600 service providers could designate their addressee in the State, and it is estimated that the number of production orders issued to those service providers will be in the hundreds of thousands annually. This has significant implications for Ireland's tech sector and criminal justice system. How we implement this framework matters well beyond our borders. Implementation will enhance Ireland's reputation as a hub for digital regulation and ensure effective and timely access to digital evidence in tackling serious crime to the benefit of all EU citizens. The EU e-evidence package, which this Bill seeks to implement, is composed of two separate but interdependent legislative instruments: the e-evidence regulation and the e-evidence directive. The regulation, which the Oireachtas agreed to opt in to in 2018, has direct effect, while the directive is an internal market instrument which is binding on Ireland. The regulation imposes an obligation upon service providers to preserve or produce electronic evidence at the request of a judicial authority of another member state, imposing a legal obligation upon them to do so. The directive requires that member states ensure service providers offering services in the EU designate an addressee to process incoming orders. It also obliges member states to check that service providers adequately resource and empower addressees to respond to production orders. Both the regulation and the directive require that penalty provisions be put in place to address issues of non-compliance as and when they arise. The Bill provides for the establishment of the office of director of criminal justice international co-operation. This office, headed by a director with statutory powers, will serve as the regulatory body for implementation of the EU e-evidence package in Ireland. The Bill provides that the director will be designated as the central authority under both the e-evidence regulation and directive, and as the enforcement authority under the e-evidence regulation. The director will be responsible for the monitoring and enforcement of compliance by service providers with the e-evidence regulation, as well as their obligations under the e-evidence directive. The director will have the power to impose financial penalties on service providers that are in contravention of their obligations under the e-evidence regulation or directive. The director may also refuse certain production orders on various grounds, including that the execution of the order might violate fundamental rights or where the conduct for which the order has been issued is not an offence in this jurisdiction. Unfortunately, and notwithstanding the significant efforts made by my officials and the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, the transposition deadline for the e-evidence directive of 18 February 2026 could not be met. Transposition of the directive via this Bill is, therefore, imperative for Ireland to achieve. The e-evidence regulation applies from 18 August 2026. The Government intends that this target will be met. The director will also be assigned the role of competent authority for the scrutinising of incoming removal orders under the EU terrorist content online regulation, addressing a separate outstanding legal obligation. I will turn now to providing an outline of the various provisions of the Bill. The Bill is composed of five Parts and a Schedule. Part 1 is comprised of standard provisions concerning the Short Title, commencement and expenses, and the definition of key words and terms used in the Bill. It also addresses matters relating to the designation of the director as the competent authority under Article 12(1)(b) of the terrorist content online regulation. Section 1 of the Bill provides for the Short Title and commencement of the Bill. Section 2 provides for the definition of terms used in the Bill. Section 3 is a standard provision regarding expenses incurred in the administration of the Bill. Section 4 provides for the designation of the director of criminal justice international co-operation as the competent authority for the purposes of Article 12(1)(b) of the terrorist content online regulation. Section 5 is a necessary companion provision to section 4, providing for the revocation of the European Union (Online Dissemination of Terrorist Content) (Designation of the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána as a Competent Authority) Regulations 2025, SI 375/2025. These regulations provide for the designation of the Garda Commissioner as competent authority, which was done on a temporary basis pending the enactment of this Bill. Section 6 provides for the service of notices or other documents under this Bill, including by electronic means. Section 7 is a standard provision relating to regulations and orders to be made under this Bill. Part 2 of the Bill, comprising sections 8 to 22, inclusive, provides for the establishment of the office of director of criminal justice international co-operation, the appointment of the director and staff, the functions of the director and other related matters. Section 8 provides for the establishment of oifig an stiúrthóra um chomhar idirnáisiúnta ceartais choiriúil or, in the English language, the office of director of criminal justice international co-operation. The holder of this office shall be known as the director of criminal justice international co-operation and is referred to in the Bill as "the Director". As Deputies will be aware, section 9D(1) of the Official Languages Act 2003 provides that the default and mandatory position is that newly established statutory bodies should be named in Irish only. However, provision is made in section 9D(1) for the departure from this in future enactments. Naming and establishing this body solely in Irish would adversely affect its messaging and visibility to both competent and central authorities in other EU member states that would not be familiar with the Irish language or the requirements of the 2003 Act. Section 8 also provides that the Schedule to the Bill shall have effect in relation to the director. The Schedule details the provisions applicable to the director, providing that the director will be a corporation sole with perpetual succession and official seal and power to sue and be sued and to acquire, hold and dispose of land, etc. Section 9 provides for the appointment of the director, while section 10 sets out the circumstances in which a person is not eligible for, or is disqualified from, the office of director. Section 11 is a standard provision, providing that a person cannot simultaneously hold office as both director and as a Member of the Oireachtas or a member of the European Parliament or a local authority. Section 12 provides for the resignation and removal of the director. The appointment of members of staff of the director is provided for in section 13 of the Bill, while section 14 provides for the appointment by the director of a deputy director from a member of staff of the office. Section 15 provides that the director may engage consultants and advisers. Section 16 provides that the director will be indemnified against legal costs and damages relating to the carrying out of his or her functions. Section 17 outlines the various functions of the director and provides that the director will be independent in the performance of those functions. Section 18 is a standard provision providing for the delegation of functions of the director to a member of staff. Section 19 provides that the director may enter into an information-sharing agreement with certain national authorities. Section 20 provides that the director shall submit an annual report to the Minister, while section 21 sets out the statistical information that the director must collect and submit to the Minister. Section 22 provides that the director may issue guidance notes to service providers. Part 3, comprising sections 23 and 24, provides for the designation of the director as the enforcement authority and central authority, respectively, for the purposes the e-evidence regulation. Part 4, comprising sections 25 to 30, inclusive, provides for the designation of the director as the central authority for the e-evidence directive. It also sets out the various obligations of service providers and actions that may be taken by the director in relation to their implementation. Section 25 is a standard provision providing for definition of terms used in Part 4 of the Bill. Section 26 designates the director as the central authority in the State for the e-evidence directive. Section 27 provides that service providers must designate a designated establishment or a legal representative for the receipt of, compliance with and enforcement of decisions or orders. Section 28 acts as a companion provision to this, providing that service providers must ensure that designated establishments or legal representatives have the necessary powers and resources to comply with decisions and orders. Section 29 provides that service providers must notify the director of the addresses and contact details of their designated establishments and legal representatives. Section 30 provides that service providers and their designated establishments or legal representatives shall be jointly and severally liable. Part 5, comprising sections 31 to 70, inclusive, provides the necessary enforcement mechanisms for non-compliant service providers. Section 31 provides for the definition of terms used in Part 5 of the Bill, including key phrases necessary to the mechanics of the Bill. It defines "e-evidence regulation obligation” as an obligation under Article 10, 11 or 13(4) of the e-evidence regulation. It also defines “relevant obligation” as an obligation on a service provider to, where applicable, designate a designated establishment or appoint a legal representative in accordance with section 26; provide a designated establishment or legal representative with the necessary powers and resources in accordance with section 27; comply with a notice in accordance with section 27; or notify the director in accordance with section 28. Section 32 is a standard provision intended to protect legal privilege. Section 33 creates an offence if certain persons, including staff of the director, an authorised officer or an adjudication officer, make an unauthorised disclosure of information acquired while performing functions under this Bill. Section 34 creates an offence where a person knowingly gives false information or evidence to the director or an adjudication officer. Section 35 provides for the appointment of authorised officers by the director for the purposes of the Bill. Section 36 provides for the powers of those authorised officers. Section 37 provides that a judge of the District Court may issue a search warrant authorising an authorised officer to enter a place. Section 38 provides that the director may request that a service provider provide a compliance report to enable the director to confirm that the service provider is complying with a relevant obligation. Section 39 provides that, where the director is of the opinion that a service provider has contravened a relevant obligation, the director may either enter into an agreement with the service provider in respect of the alleged contravention or cause a directed investigation to be started. Section 40 provides that the director may enter into a written agreement with a service provider setting out the steps to comply with a relevant obligation. Section 41 provides for definitions of terms used in Chapter 4 of Part 5 of the Bill. Section 42 provides that the director may direct an authorised officer to undertake a directed investigation. Section 43 provides that an authorised officer shall submit a copy of the report to the director and the service provider concerned. Section 44 sets out the actions that may be taken by the director having received and considered an investigation report, including referring the investigation report to the chief adjudication officer for the purposes of conducting an adjudication. Section 45 provides for the definition of terms in Chapter 5 of the Bill. Section 46 provides that, for the purposes of undertaking an adjudication, the chief adjudication officer shall assign an adjudication officer. Section 47 provides that service providers shall not be liable to be penalised twice for the same contravention. Section 48 sets out the actions an adjudication officer shall take for the purposes of assisting him or her in the making of a decision as to whether a service provider has committed a relevant contravention. Section 49 provides that an adjudication officer shall make a decision on the balance of probabilities as to whether a service provider has committed, or is committing, a relevant contravention. Section 50 sets out that the maximum financial penalty that can be imposed on a service provider can be no greater than 2% of the total world annual turnover of the service provider in the preceding financial year. Section 51 provides that an adjudication officer must send the director and the service provider concerned a written notice of a decision. Section 52 sets out the circumstances in which a decision as to contravention and financial penalty take effect. Section 53 provides that a service provider may appeal against a decision. Section 54 provides that, where there is no appeal, the director shall make an application in a summary manner to the Circuit Court for confirmation. Section 55 sets out procedural and other matters concerning the conduct of an oral hearing by an adjudication officer. Section 56 provides that an adjudication officer may, before making a decision as to contravention or the imposition of a financial penalty, refer a question to the High Court. Section 57 provides that an adjudication officer may award the costs of proceedings against the service provider or director for improper conduct. Section 58 provides that the Minister may make regulations. Section 59 provides that a payment made by a service provider in respect of a financial penalty shall be paid to the Exchequer. Section 60 sets out the circumstances in which a person is not eligible for appointment or disqualified from holding office as an adjudication officer. Section 61 provides that a person cannot simultaneously hold office as an adjudication officer and be an elected person. Section 62 provides for the nomination by the director of persons for appointment as adjudication officers. Section 63 provides for the appointment by the Minister of adjudication officers. Section 64 provides that an adjudication officer is independent. Section 65 provides that the Minister shall make regulations. Section 66 provides that the director may require staff, or persons on contract or appointed as advisors, to assist adjudication officers. Section 67 provides that summary proceedings for an offence may be brought and prosecuted by the director. Section 68 provides that summary proceedings for an offence under the Bill may be instituted at any time within two years. Section 69 provides for liability by corporate entities. Section 70 provides that, where a person is convicted of an offence under the Bill, the court shall order the person to pay the director any costs and expenses incurred. The provisions of the Bill have been drafted with a view to successful implementation of the EU evidence package. However, this is not only about compliance. It is also about leadership. It is an opportunity to enhance Ireland’s position as a European hub for digital regulation and a trusted partner in international justice. For law enforcement, it means faster, clearer and legally secure access to the evidence needed to tackle serious crime and for citizens, it means confidence that their data and rights are protected, as we enhance our capacity to fight crime in the digital age. The regulation provides that access to personal data through the mechanism of European production orders will be subject to existing data protection rules and principles. In particular, the regulation reiterates the requirements of necessity and proportionality and sets out the key safeguards in this area, including the limitations on the types of data that can be requested and the ability of enforcing States to object to orders under certain circumstances. The EU-evidence package will be implemented in a manner which respects fundamental rights and freedoms, including individuals' rights to privacy and data protection. I look forward to hearing the views and observations of Deputies and answering their questions on this important Bill.

I welcome this opportunity to discuss the EU e-evidence package and this legislation, which seeks to transpose it into Irish law. The broad purpose of this package and legislation is evidently worthy. With an estimated up to 80% of court cases involving electronic evidence in some format and relevant companies often being headquartered outside the jurisdictions where the crime is alleged to have been committed, we should, of course, seek to introduce efficiencies where existing processes may struggle with scale. The question then is whether the Minister has got the approach right. I remain unconvinced he has for various reasons. Another week has passed in which the Minister has engaged in poor parliamentary practice. Here we are again debating a Bill on Second Stage when the deadline for Committee Stage amendments has already passed. If something were to come up in this debate, I would not be able to table an amendment on it because the deadline has already passed. That is bad practice. This follows a number of instances where Bills have been similarly rushed and, especially in recent weeks, we have had motions to extend the purpose of other Bills - some multiple times - to introduce various unrelated subject matters to legislation already in process. All this means is that legislation passes through these Houses with the bare minimum of scrutiny, and in some cases virtually no scrutiny at all. The reason the Minister will give that this legislation must be rushed is that the transposition deadline was last February and with the directive due to come into force in August. I put on record Sinn Féin's utter disgust that the Dáil is seeing its constitutional mandate limited by the Minister, arising from his failure to meet his obligation to process legislation in a timely and competent manner. That needs to change. Taking such an approach to the Dáil plays a role in undermining public confidence in our political institutions. I invite the Minister to reflect on his role in that. I understand the Department officials considered whether any existing State body or agency could take on the functions of this office but found there is no existing criminal justice body equipped to deal with the task required by the e-evidence package. We also know the majority of orders across the EU are expected to be processed through Ireland, so what we are dealing with is important, substantive and could have a significant impact in Ireland. While the e-evidence package has been presented in terms of efficiencies, it is not at all apparent it will not have the opposite impact in Ireland. The Department seems to think there will be minimal impact on court services but the Courts Service itself seems much more circumspect and has stated there is limited data available on the number of cases that may arise after commencement. It went on to say the Department’s projections may prove optimistic. That is hardly a ringing endorsement. Then there are the efficiencies the office is meant to bring. With the majority of orders expected to be processed here, it will be the Irish taxpayer who picks up the tab for virtually the entire European Union. The Minister will say it is a small price to pay and arises out of foreign direct investment but I would be interested whether he could provide a single example whereby an individual member state was on the hook to such an extent regarding a single directive or regulations. From our engagement with Department officials, it seems the Minister cannot even tell us the scale, the cost or where this new body is going to end up. There is €2.8 million set aside for this year to provide for 29 staff and associated costs. Officials see it moving upwards to 150 staff but there seems little certainty that will be a cap of sorts, especially given indications it is already intended to expand the remit of this new office to include the European investigation orders. Significant concerns also exist about the safeguards in this Bill. Department officials acknowledged at the committee that in theory the regulation is based on the idea of full faith and credit in the member states' legal systems. "Theory" is doing an awful lot of heavy lifting here. In the past decade, we have seen democratic backsliding from some European Union states as well as issues with the rule of law. We have seen interference in the judicial system, European governments seeking to deny fundamental rights and the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia due to her journalism exposing major acts of corruption. These are just a few examples. I, therefore, have major concerns with the approach of this Bill and the potential for rogue governments, or elements in governments, to abuse the trust and authority the Minister would vest in them. I appreciate he may say the entire European project might be based on such a theory but in this instance we are talking about fundamental rights. We are talking about political persecution. In that context, that seems designed to minimise judicial and Irish oversight. Sinn Féin is not alone in having a critique of safeguards in the e-evidence package generally. As highlighted by Digital Rights Ireland in its submission to the justice committee, in an article on balancing efficiency and fundamental rights in this package, one academic described the e-evidence package as having minimal fundamental safeguards, so there is an absolute need for any Irish legislation to empower a Minister to suspend co-operation, where necessary. There was also extensive discussion at the Oireachtas justice committee on the issue of dual criminality and in particular how the civil law systems will relate to Ireland’s common law tradition. I do not believe engagement with Department officials answered all the questions raised or left members entirely reassured. Sinn Féin believes there needs to be strong, robust provisions in any Irish legislation that ensure information may only be provided where an alleged offence constitutes and offence under Irish criminal law. Sinn Féin is also concerned about the administrative burden this could place on SMEs. The Government’s SME test identified this will impact SMEs more than larger companies and that they will incur administrative and compliance costs, notably working against ongoing efforts to increase competitiveness and reduce administrative and regulatory business. It would be more useful if the director of this office had an ongoing, explicit mandate to ensure minimal administrative burden for the SME sector specifically. An area of particular concern to me is the ability of smaller SMEs to meet the required timeframes necessitated by this legislation, which could be as little as eight hours in the case of an emergency order. Section 49, as the Minister said, provides that in exceptional circumstances, where a service provider is in breach, an adjudication officer may decide not to impose a financial penalty. The Bill later clarifies such exceptional circumstances may include a micro-enterprise of fewer than ten people not responding to an emergency order. I am not at all confident this is robust enough a safeguard for SMEs. In any small businesses, not just micro-enterprises, it would not be exceptional to not have 24-7 cover, which is in effect what this Bill mandates them to have. Sinn Féin welcomes that it is envisaged a decentralised IT system will be developed to facilitate engagement and reporting to SMEs. It would be of use if the Minister could provide an update on the status of this in his closing remarks. While the Minister's Bill makes provision for engagement and information-sharing with other relevant public bodies like the Garda, Coimisiún na Meán and others, there is nothing in here on the Data Protection Commission. Given the concerns that exist, it would be reassuring for the Minister to, at the very least, similarly facilitate formal engagement between the office and the Data Protection Commission. The proposed legislation is rushed. It leaves too many questions remaining on key provisions, especially about sovereignty, safeguards and the rule of law. Consequently, Sinn Féin cannot support this Bill in its current format.

There is no dispute that an office of this nature is required. International co-operation, especially in regard to electronic data is obviously something we continually need as we move into the modern age. An awful lot of criminal cases will reach for information that is being stored in the cloud somewhere and an application will have to be made to try to pull that information down. That can often cause, as the Minister is well aware, huge delays in the criminal process and in moving cases forward, so this type of legislation is obviously needed. The way we are connected electronically across the world and across Europe is evidence of that. It is unfortunate this legislation is being rushed in the way it is. It is not allowing for the proper kind of scrutiny we need for something of this scale being established. The time we have to debate it is very limited. It is supposed to come into effect on 18 August with the EU regulation. To suggest the office would be up and running given the huge scale of this is extremely ambitious but perhaps the Minister will enlighten us as to how that is going to happen. That it could be done in such a short time would be pretty amazing. If we were able to do everything else as quickly here, we would be well ahead of things but we are where we are. The EU evidence regulation was adopted three years ago in 2023. Many people are pointing to the delay as being due to some level of incompetence, possibly on the part of the Government. We are now deciding we are going to rush it through the House. It is estimated service providers based in Ireland will receive in excess of 300,000 orders per annum because of the number of these information technology companies based here. Expecting the office, which is to be set up in such a short time, to be able to deal with that volume is something we really need to get answers about. Answers have not been provided in respect of that to date. There are serious questions about the financial and human resources this office is going to need. We are all aware of the difficulties people have in recruiting staff, especially where technological expertise is needed, as it certainly will be in respect of this office. It is even very difficult to get administrative staff, so I just do not understand how the Minister expects that this office is going to get established in that short period. The adequate level of resources needed is something that needs to be addressed. We are aware that there are concerns in relation to the lack of safeguards and incentives for service providers to consider data rights and other rights. We also have laws around privacy and laws to prevent overreach. That has to be taken into consideration. There is a right to appeal in the legislation and that could significantly increase times and put pressure on our Courts Service. Five member states issued statements expressing concerns about the protection of fundamental rights and the application of effective judicial review under the e-evidence package. The concerns related to grounds of refusal in a case of manifest breach of fundamental rights. There are a number of those rights. One is the possibility of double criminality. It is about whether Ireland will inadvertently contribute to human rights abuses. That is something we all have to be conscious of. We see a level of, quite frankly, fascism arising in many states around the world. The impact that may have has to be considered. Would Ireland facilitate the prosecution of individuals who have committed acts that would not constitute a criminal offence here? I notice in the Minister's opening remarks he suggested that would not happen. That is welcome if it is the case. There is the requirement for a publicly accessible register providing information on requests from other member states and questions around how those requests will be processed and their respective outcomes. There is a lack of safeguards and incentives for providers to consider data protection rights and other fundamental rights. In all these situations, the right to privacy and fundamental human rights have to be protected. We are aware of the debates around social media in many jurisdictions. In most cases, it may come down to social media companies' preparedness to co-operate with the criminal justice system, which has been unfortunately absent in most cases to date. I hope the level of penalties put in place will be enough to do that. There is provision for 2% of annual turnover; in other circumstances, it can be up to 10% of annual turnover. Is this something we are falling short on? We need to have sharp teeth when it comes to dealing with these companies. To date, that has not been the case and they have been allowed to get away with far too much in many jurisdictions. I am not just picking on Ireland or the European Union; it has been a global phenomenon. My colleagues, Deputies Carthy and Ward, have tabled a number of amendments that they hope will provide assurances and protection to Irish citizens and to small and medium providers, who also need to be protected. This Bill is coming at the eleventh hour. It is very rushed. It is a big piece of legislation and is establishing something that will have a major impact. It is impossible to support legislation coming in this manner. The Minister's Department would do well to sit down, look at how it prepares and work out systems for the future because this is not the way to proceed on matters of such importance.

Taking up on what Deputy Kenny said, there are two things. This is not the first time we have dealt with legislation like this. We are talking about transposing the EU e-evidence package, the regulation and the directive. It has been on the books for a considerable amount of time. It has taken too long for us to get to this point and now that we are, as per normal, it is utterly last minute. We want a sufficient amount of time to do some element of due diligence. My colleagues, Deputies Ward and Kenny, have spoken about some of the issues. Where technology meets domestic and international law, we all know the difficulties that are involved. For those involved in investigating and prosecuting crimes, there is a requirement that they can get the evidence. Sometimes, the first time you see issues of antisocial behaviour or whatever is when they are up on TikTok or somebody has taken a screen grab on Snapchat. You are sent that and you send it to the guards. The guards talk about the difficulties they have in getting that information and getting it in the correct format, even when dealing with companies that are based here. We want to see this office set up to deal with these issues for those across the European Union looking for evidence, particularly given that a significant number of the big players in the tech world have their headquarters here. Therefore, there will be multiple contacts. Deputy Kenny spoke about 300,000 requests. It is hard to see how this office, no matter how it is resourced, would not be overwhelmed by that. We need to have the systems, know-how and technology to deal with this. There is a huge issue when dealing with social media giants from the point of view of delivering evidence. Nearly every committee in the Oireachtas has dealt with the big tech companies, such is their impact on and footprint in the world in which we live. It has generally been from the point of view that we have insufficient regulation and leverage to deal with what they offer, which is social media platforms that are addictive by design, have recommender algorithms and are based on keeping people online no matter what the material is. They will say they offer a service that goes above and beyond the law and that the minute nefarious material is there, they get rid of it. What anyone realises who has lived in the real world, used any of these platforms or talked to the young people in front of the children's committee, the EU affairs committee or the media committee is that these companies have made little effort in relation to facilitating those who have had information put up that is detrimental to them. I have a particular issue with it. We know what sort of material we are talking about. We are talking about sometimes intimate material, including intimate material produced through artificial intelligence. I have no doubt this office will be dealing with a huge number of these issues. When we talk about Coimisiún na Meán, the Data Protection Commission and even the European Commission, I am not quite sure they are sufficiently resourced to take on Google, Meta or TikTok. I think I said before it is like having your winter league team going up against Barcelona at their best. We need to resource the office. There is a particular issue in relation to this office. We are talking about social media bans but we are not next or near having a conversation and ensuring we have the tools-----

Thank you, Deputy Ó Murchú.

-----to really put it up to these companies so we can make this place safer for all who use social media, particularly young people,-----

Thank you, Deputy. I call Deputy Gannon.

-----and tackle the issues in relation to disinformation and even more nefarious material that we keep seeing.

Do you know when the clock goes red, Deputy? Just in case you do not know-----

I am colour-blind.

It is when the Chair asks you to move on.

Nobody is for a second disputing the problem this legislation is trying to solve. The reality is electronic evidence now forms part of almost every criminal investigation, whether organised crime, fraud, child exploitation, trafficking or terrorism. The days when investigations were confined to physical evidence and paper trails are long gone. The need for international co-operation is real, as is the need to modernise how evidence is gathered, but good intentions do not automatically make good legislation. What concerns me about this Bill is it feels like another example of a Department of justice, led by the Minister, that has become obsessed with speed, efficiency and finding shortcuts, and increasingly detached from the practical realities of delivering the public services and judicial services we need. In short, it is all hurry and no pace. When you scratch beneath the surface of this proposal, there are enormous questions that remain unanswered. The first is resourcing. During pre-legislative scrutiny, the Department told the committee that Ireland could ultimately become responsible for processing over 300,000 electronic evidence requests every year because so many of the major technology companies operating across Europe were headquartered here. With 300,000 potential requests, the Department has budgeted exactly €2.8 million and allocated an initial staff complement of 30 people. I struggle to understand how anyone can look at those figures and conclude that they remotely add up to the seriousness of what we are discussing. The Department itself admitted during scrutiny that it did not yet know how many of those requests would require intervention and what the final staffing requirement would be. It admitted that the office may eventually require 150 staff or more. Let us be honest about what is happening here. We are being asked to establish a major new State body with significant powers and responsibilities without knowing how much it will ultimately cost, how many staff it will require or whether the proposed model is remotely capable of coping with the workload that is potentially coming, and it is being sold to us in the language of efficiency. Everything is about speeding things up. Everything is about streamlining processes but there is a difference between efficiency and what appears to me to be wishful thinking on the Minister's part. If he genuinely believes that 30 staff can oversee a system potentially dealing with hundreds of thousands of requests every year, we are not building an efficient system; we are building a backlog, building delays, building appeals and, ultimately, building costs - far greater costs that if the system had been properly designed and resourced in the first place. The second major concern I have is regarding the human rights implications of this Bill. One of the most important issues raised during pre-legislative scrutiny was the reality that not every EU member state had the same track record when it came to civil liberties, democratic standards and human rights protection. We heard concerns about democratic backsliding, surveillance powers, and journalists, activists and minority groups who potentially might be targeted. The answers we received about hugely important matters, such as abortion rights, freedom of expression and LGBT rights, were not particularly reassuring. In fact, the Department acknowledged that if the new office did not intervene within the required timeframe, the service provider may simply proceed regardless. I ask the Minister to think about that. The safeguards in the system are only as strong as the capacity of the office tasked with enforcing them, which brings us directly back to the resourcing issue because rights-based protections on paper are meaningless if the body responsible for protecting those rights is overwhelmed from day 1, and that is precisely why the amendments to the Bill are so important. Amendments dealing with human rights protections, double criminality, transparency and reporting requirements are not attempts to derail the legislation. They are attempts to make it workable. They seem like attempts to introduce the safeguards that many people assumed would already be present. The amendments requiring greater scrutiny would not constitute an offence under Irish law and the amendments strengthening accountability are fundamental safeguards that this Bill needs, and if the Government is not willing to accept those safeguards or bring forward alternatives that achieve the same objective, I do not believe that this legislation is tenable in its current form. The Department is effectively asking us to trust a system of extraordinary scale while simultaneously admitting that it does not yet know what scale that system will operate at. That is the exact moment when safeguards matter most. Not after something goes wrong or rights have been infringed, but before these powers are granted. This Bill does not exist in isolation. It is part of a pattern of decision-making within the Department of justice, led by the Minister, where efficiency increasingly appears to trump expertise. I will highlight one recent example of that that left me shocked to my core, namely, the contract awarded to respond to the arrival of unaccompanied minors. A management services company, one that specialises in pest control, was awarded that contract. You could not make that up. At the same time that highly skilled organisations with extensive experience in trauma-informed care for children and young people were applying for that work, a management company that specialised in pest control was awarded the contract, but, apparently, that is where expertise mattered. That is where efficiency mattered. That, unfortunately, is exactly the same mindset that seems to underpin legislation such as this - the belief that if we centralise enough, automate enough, outsource enough and streamline enough, somehow everything will become cheaper, quicker and better. That, quite clearly, does not work, because public services are not about managing units and every time we try to squeeze complex human problems into simplistic administrative solutions, we end up paying for it later. We will see this over the next couple of years. We will pay for it more through appeals. We will pay through delays. We will pay through court challenges. If this office is under-resourced, if decisions are rushed and if safeguards fail, millions of euro will ultimately be squandered dealing with the consequences - far more than would have been spent getting it right in the first place. That is why I believe we can do better than this, that we can have a system that facilitates international co-operation, tackles serious crime and allows evidence to move efficiently across borders, but that we can also have a system that is properly resourced, transparent and built on realistic assessments of workload rather than opportunistic assumptions. If this legislation is genuinely expected to deal with hundreds of thousands of requests every year, we should stop pretending that €2.8 million and 30 staff constitute a serious answer to that challenge because we owe the public something better than that. I believe there is a pattern here. We are talking about efficiency. It happened last week in the Dáil during the miscellaneous provisions Bill the Minister brought through where we questioned the fact that we had so many different aspects of the judicial system all contained within the same Bill and the Minister's response was that he was getting a lot done. There is a difference between being in a hurry and having some pace that brings lasting achievement. I have not seen any of it and we will not see any of it in this Bill either.

I welcome the opportunity to speak on the Criminal Justice (International Cooperation on Electronic Evidence and Other Matters) Bill 2026. The objective of this Bill is to support efforts to tackle crime being facilitated over the Internet. The large drugs cartel being organised on an encrypted app, the fraud run from a server in another country, the grooming of a child through a social media account or the money laundered through a chain of digital transactions - none of these crimes respects a border. The evidence sits on servers that may be in Dublin, in Frankfurt, in any country or in a data centre on another continent. The development of the online ecosystem has outpaced existing legislation, and even where national governments have introduced legislation, the transnational nature of the problem means an EU-wide response is warranted and necessary to address the issue. Today, when a Garda investigation needs evidence held on servers in another member state, the process is slow. A European investigation order can take up to 120 days. A mutual legal assistance request takes, on average, ten months. Think about what ten months mean in a live investigation. Data is deleted, trails go cold and victims ultimately wait. A suspect who should go before a court remains at large. That delay is not a technical inconvenience; it is a gap that major criminals regularly exploit. This Bill closes that gap. It transposes the EU e-evidence directive and gives further effect to the e-evidence regulation. Together, they create two new tools. The first is the European production order. This will allow a judicial authority in one member state to obtain electronic evidence directly from a service provider in another. It must respond within ten days or, in an emergency, within eight hours. It is ten days instead of ten months. The second is the European preservation order, which allows authorities to require that specific data be preserved so it is not lost while a fuller request is prepared. The scale here is significant. It is expected that up to 600 service providers could designate an addressee in Ireland. The number of production orders issued to providers based here is anticipated to exceed 300,000 every year. Our own authorities are likely to issue around 2,000 orders to providers in other member states to advance investigations here at home. These are not abstract figures. Each order represents an investigation into a real crime affecting real people. To manage this, the Bill establishes a new office, the office of director of criminal justice international co-operation. The new office is necessary, as it centralises functions that would otherwise be scattered across existing bodies. The State is right to centralise the skills, expertise and responsibility to one office. There will be a single point of contact for cross-border co-operation on electronic evidence. The director will monitor and enforce compliance by service providers and will have the power to impose financial penalties where providers fail to meet their obligations. On the previous speaker's point about staffing, it is clear that the office will be built up on a phased basis, with the process to appoint a director now under way. When the State takes on new powers to access people's data, the safeguards matter as much as the powers themselves. The Bill, and the package behind it, takes that seriously. It is important to note the protections being proposed. The framework guarantees strong protection of fundamental rights, including the right to the protection of personal data. A person whose data is sought is entitled to legal remedies. Where it is warranted, the authorities of the member state in which the provider is established will be brought in through a notification mechanism and can stop the production of data on a defined list of grounds. The director here in Ireland will scrutinise certain incoming production orders and may refuse them on the grounds set out in the regulation. Where a provider faces a conflict of laws, a specific procedure involving a judge or a court applies. All of this will be run through a secure, decentralised IT system that authenticates everyone taking part. Requests for sensitive data will not be flying around on email. These are real checks, not just window dressing. The Bill also does something sensible in joining up our response to terrorist content online. Under the EU's terrorist content online regulation, removal orders can be issued requiring hosting providers to take down terrorist material. The receiving state must be able to scrutinise those orders to ensure they do not breach the regulation or, indeed, fundamental rights. Ireland struggled to find a suitable body for that scrutiny role. The Garda Commissioner was designated on an interim basis to address an infringement case. The Bill assigns that scrutiny function to the new director, where it sits naturally alongside the very similar task of scrutinising incoming production orders. It is a coherent fit and puts a proper, permanent arrangement in place. The transposition deadline for the e-evidence directive was 18 February this year. I welcome the work to date by the Minister and his officials on the legislation. Ireland hosts a large share of Europe's digital economy. Many of the service providers that other member states will turn to for evidence are based here. That gives us a responsibility and an opportunity. By implementing this package fully and on a proper footing, we confirm Ireland as a serious centre of expertise for digital regulation and a reliable partner in the digital Single Market. We give legal certainty to the businesses operating here. We also give confidence to our European partners that when they come looking for evidence of a serious crime, Ireland will be ready to assist lawfully and quickly. This Bill is about giving An Garda Síochána and our courts the modern tools they need to investigate modern types of crime while protecting the rights of citizens at every step. It honours a commitment in the programme for Government, it meets our European obligations and it makes us a more compatible and trustworthy partner in the fight against serious cross-border crimes.

This is an important Bill that deals with the most serious of questions, namely, how we keep our citizens and citizens of neighbouring states safe and how we co-operate with our European neighbours to ensure the rights of our citizens are protected. The Minister has publicly stated that the Bill is an important step in demonstrating Ireland's commitment to implementing the EU's e-evidence package and improving access to digital evidence for serious crime investigations. It is about how we make sure that the digital world is one where laws are enforced, rights are safeguarded and the technology giants upon which so much of modern life depends play their part and are held accountable. I understand that the rush to legislate is not unusual for EU deadline-driven legislation. We faced similar time pressures in the past when implementing EU directives or regulations with fixed application dates. However, the seriously reduced opportunity to engage with this Bill in the House is both unfortunate and somewhat disrespectful to Members. Given the package was first endorsed in the EU in 2023, it really beggars belief that we could not have had far more dialogue on it before now. The Bill puts in place an entirely new office and staff to enforce its rules. The Department has made clear that this body will grow to a substantial size and carry a significant budget with it. Ireland, being home to many of the world's biggest technology and digital services firms, can expect to have a large workload arising from these EU rules. We can be leaders in that but it is absolutely vital that we get it right from the off. We must be sure that the procedures and bodies we put in place to carry out the work are properly resourced and are given not just enough powers but the right powers. This is a Bill that deserves close scrutiny in the Oireachtas. The questions at play are simply too important to risk getting it wrong. International co-operation on law enforcement is absolutely essential, particularly in the digital space. Digital evidence does not respect borders, and police forces and enforcement bodies simply cannot afford to operate in national silos when it comes to online evidence. The European Union is in a unique position globally to put the mechanisms in place to ensure its member states' national and local law enforcement bodies co-operate in this area. That idea was at the heart of the EU's e-evidence package and it is at the heart of this Bill. It is a sensible and welcome idea. However, we in the Labour Party have some questions about the legislation, which we will raise as it progresses through the Oireachtas. The first issue I raise concerns privileged material. It is an issue that been raised repeatedly in the House in recent times. Repeatedly, the Government has been slow to recognise the importance of protecting legal or journalistic privilege when bringing forward legislation. That has been particularly true in relation to legislation coming from the Department of justice. Subsections (3) and (4) of section 32 allow for the compelled disclosure of potentially privileged material subject to a subsequent High Court determination, with a 30-day window to apply. The key word here is "subsequent". The 30-day window runs from the date of disclosure or taking of possession but there is no explicit ban or any kind of interim restraint on the use of that privileged material while the court application is pending. It is essential to address this issue and, to that end, we have tabled amendments to make clear in the Bill that where an authorised officer or adjudication officer compels disclosure or takes possession of a record that may be subject to legal privilege, the officer cannot use, copy, communicate or act upon that record before the High Court's determination. Our amendments will be debated on Committee Stage tomorrow. I hope the Government will look closely at the issue and accept the amendments. This is common sense. Legal privilege must be protected throughout the process. The Government recognises that by including section 32 in the first place but we need to ensure that there are no potential loopholes. We cannot have a situation where legislation potentially allows for the free usage of material that might later be ruled privileged by the High Court. We also have serious questions about the resourcing of the new office of the director of criminal justice international co-operation and the potential costs associated with it. Those concerns were raised during pre-legislative scrutiny and I have yet to see a convincing answer to them from the Government. As the home to a very large number of digital service providers, Ireland can expect a larger number of requests relative to our size than other member states. How will the Government ensure that the new office can handle that large volume of work without doing so being to the detriment of the current workings of the Department of justice? We have heard that the expectation is that the office could grow in size to 150 staff. The estimate based on current numbers is that it will deal with 24,000 notifications each year. However, the actual number could be much higher. The Department has said that the number of notifications sent to the office will only be known once the regulation comes into effect. There is real potential for two different scenarios, neither of which is welcome. We could have an under-resourced office that cannot keep up with the amount of work landing on its desk, leading to long waiting times or even mistakes being made, or we may have an office that keeps expanding and taking an ever-growing share of the Department's expenditure and requiring ever-growing staff numbers. There is a real risk of a very large cost arising that balloons over time. I have no doubt that this work is important, even vital, but how will the Government ensure the potential costs and resourcing requirements are properly managed? We can look at the example of the National Cyber Security Centre, which is a key public body aimed at keeping digital space safe. It has been under resourced and overworked throughout its existence. We cannot afford to keep making the same mistakes, and the Government has done nothing to earn our confidence that this new office will not face similar challenges. Can the Minister give real assurances that this body will be properly resourced to undertake the substantial job of work that will come across its desk and that a proper assessment of the potential for future growth in a number of notifications that it deals with has been carried out? Finally, it is essential that Ireland does not risk double criminalisation and we do not end up facilitating the prosecution of individuals who have committed an act that would not constitute a criminal offence here in Ireland. This issue was also raised at pre-legislative scrutiny. For example, if an EU member state were to criminalise the provision of online information about abortion services, would there be a risk that Ireland would be required to collaborate in evidence-sharing about a potential breach of that law? I have seen the Department's response to the committee's pre-legislative scrutiny report, which seems to point to Article 12(1)(d) of the e-evidence regulation for reassurance on this point. However, it still seems to be the case that service providers based in Ireland, as distinct from the new office itself, could be compelled to co-operate on such a case. I would welcome more clarity on this from the Minister. Can he assure the House that this legislation will not undermine Irish law in any way? International co-operation on digital law enforcement is absolutely vital, particularly within the EU; no one on these benches will argue with that. However, there are significant elements of this Bill that need greater clarity from the Government, and we will continue to press those as this Bill moves forward.

I commend the Minister and his Department on bringing forward the Bill. The Government committed to implementing the e-evidence package and to establishing the new office of the director of criminal justice international co-operation, CJICO, in the programme for Government. It is welcome to see that commitment now being progressed. The Bill is practical and necessary and will strengthen Ireland's ability to access digital evidence to support criminal investigations. It will also help to ensure those involved in serious and organised crime can be brought before the courts and ultimately brought to justice. We all know criminal gangs do not respect borders and that their activities are not confined to one village, one county or even one country. Criminal networks are international, and their communications are often online. Their financing, planning and contacts can move across borders in seconds. We have to be able to respond to that. We cannot underplay the importance of international co-operation. We have seen in recent weeks how working closely with other jurisdictions and law enforcement agencies can lead to major breakthroughs in tackling transnational organised crime and can bring significant players in the criminal underworld to justice. When gardaí can co-operate effectively with their counterparts in other countries, it becomes much harder for these criminals to hide behind borders. In today's day and age, everything is done through digital means and crime is no different. A person in this State can easily communicate with a group on the other side of the world to organise a drug shipment, move money and co-ordinate other criminal activity. This can happen quickly and discreetly, and the evidence of that activity may be held by a service provider in another EU country. In these circumstances, any delay can seriously damage an investigation. Investigations into organised crime are increasingly dependent on digital evidence and there are countless cases where convictions have been secured based on digital material. We have to support An Garda Síochána insofar is possible to make it faster and easier for it to access electronic evidence. Speed matters in any investigation and it is particularly important in organised crime cases, where those engaged in this activity will often try to cover their tracks, encrypt their communications or delete incriminating material entirely. The European production and preservation orders provided for in the e-evidence package and this legislation will be an important tool in ensuring relevant evidence can be obtained or preserved quickly. The creation of the new office of the director of criminal justice international co-operation is very welcome and the Bill gives that office real teeth by giving it the power to monitor and enforce compliance by service providers. Criminals are quick to adapt and will seek to carry out their activities wherever they can. The State must be a step ahead of them and must be able to respond urgently. We need to look ahead of the curve to see what technology is coming down the tracks so that we can keep up with it. In particular, AI as a tool can be very positive while also nefarious at the same time. This Bill will help close gaps criminals have been able to exploit. It will improve co-operation with our European partners, support the gathering of new evidence and, most important, assist in holding those involved in serious and organised crime to account.

Cuirim fáilte roimh an mBille seo. Déanaim comhghairdeas leis an Aire freisin as ucht an luais a bhí leis. Nuair atáimid ag labhairt faoin dlí ag an leibhéal Eorpach, is gá dúinn na rialacha mar sin a chur sa dlí sa tír seo. Déanaim comhghairdeas leis maidir leis sin. Ag an am céanna, bhí mé ag éisteacht leis an díospóireacht anseo freisin. Tá a fhios agam go bhfuil daoine sa Teach seo a bhfuil imní orthu faoi rudaí atá sa Bhille agus ceisteanna atá fós le freagairt ag an Aire. Labhróidh mé fúthu siúd ar feadh tamaillín. While it is obviously very important to implement this legislation and to give legal effect to the European regulations and directives in law in this country, it is important that we do so in a way that is effective, above challenge and is going to work. I note what the Minister said about the likelihood that many of the companies that will be affected by the EU e-evidence package will give their addressee in this State. This will possibly result in hundreds of thousands of requests, under the package, being brought to companies in this State and therefore being subject to regulation within this State. That is a significant administrative burden, so I would certainly welcome an assurance from the Minister that resources will be given to the office to ensure it can carry out its function. That is what I mean when I say it must be effective. If we are to give legal meaning to this legislation, it must be something where the CJICO to be established here will be able to do the work it has to do. However, let me say this on co-operation with our European colleagues: I cannot think of a single example where it was not absolutely in Ireland's interest to be part of exercises and co-operation agreements exactly like this. As a small country in Europe, albeit one in which digital and technological regulation has come to the fore for us because so many companies have been headquartered here, it nonetheless serves us at every head's turn to be part of co-operation agreements with our European colleagues so that we can share information with them and will also be the beneficiaries of access to information across the European Union. Looking specifically at law enforcement, I have listened to colleagues who have said crime does not respect borders, and they are absolutely correct in that regard. When we look at European law enforcement, we should be moving, to the greatest extent possible, to a single jurisdiction on this Continent so that we can accelerate the enforcement of law and the prosecution of those responsible for breaking the law. That said, we also need to build safeguards into all legislation. I listened to what was said about concerns relating to potential discrepancies between law in one member state and this member state and the idea that Irish addressees or companies based in this jurisdiction would therefore be aiding another jurisdiction to prosecute an offence that is not known to law in this jurisdiction. Safeguards are important. I know reference was made to Article 12(1)(d). I must say I am satisfied this gives the assurance required. In this context, for example, with the European arrest warrant framework that came into law over 20 years ago, at that time, if I remember correctly, during the debates there were also concerns regarding offences in other countries that were not offences here. The concern was that people would be extradited or surrendered all the time to other European countries for matters we do not recognise as against the law here. Again, notwithstanding the concerns expressed by Members at that time, that framework specifically addressed that, and in a similar way to what Article 12 does in the e-evidence package with a view to saying, "Actually, no, you cannot do that." We have seen in the European arrest warrant framework, for example, that it is something the High Court must establish here before the extradition or surrender ever takes place. The High Court here must be satisfied that the offence complained of by the jurisdiction seeking to have a person surrendered is a matter known to Irish law. I would say the same must be true in terms of the operation of the CJICO and it satisfying itself. Article 12 gives that but, again, I would be grateful to hear confirmation from the Minister that he is also satisfied Article 12 does this. The reality is that we are not just a geographic island but also, in many ways, a legal island within the European Union. The common law jurisdiction that operates here has benefited us hugely from the point of view of continuity over time in the interpretation of the law by our judges. It has also benefited us in the sense that international businesses and individuals coming to this State can rely on a rule of law that is consistently applied and the direction of which can be visibly seen. They can have confidence that our system applies the law in a way that they can predict and therefore they can abide by. There are other technical common law jurisdictions in the European Union - Cyprus and Malta, for example. They are more hybrid than we are. We are essentially the last pure common law jurisdiction left in the European Union after Brexit. We have to be mindful that different legal systems create different ways in which crime is prosecuted. In many respects, I have concerns about the way certain matters are addressed by courts under civil law jurisdiction and the rights that we take for granted in this jurisdiction may not be as openly available to citizens in other European countries. That is not to call into question the effectiveness or the fairness of their legal systems; it is just different. However, because of that difference, we have to create that balancing act between the two to ensure that there is not an injustice perpetrated because of a request made from one country to an addressee in this country in relation to something that may be at variance with our laws. I would be grateful to the Minister for confirmation that there is not an issue under Article 12 and that that satisfies any concerns that might exist in that regard. I come back to the efficiency issue in relation to the operation of the CJICO. I ask the Minister to address the question of resources that will be made available to it. If, for example, hundreds of addressees who are based in this jurisdiction are nominated by companies in the digital space in Europe and we find hundreds of thousands of requests being made from across the European Union to this jurisdiction, will the resources to be available to the CJICO to deal with those requests? Has provision been made or consideration given to how that will happen? Again, I refer to the European arrest warrant framework in this regard. Countries have applied it differently without any criticism. For example, Poland identified the European arrest warrant framework as a very effective way of getting citizens, particularly from Ireland, to go back to Poland. There has been criticism in the Supreme Court of the minor nature of some offences on which the return of a Polish citizen from Ireland was sought by Poland. Again, that is something that had to be dealt with by the Supreme Court. If, for example, the CJICO feels that a request is frivolous - in using that word I do so without any criticism - or more minor than may have been envisaged initially in this Bill or in the package generally, is that something that CJICO will be empowered to deal with itself? Will it have recourse to the courts? What will the ultimate arbiter be if addressees in this jurisdiction are receiving requests from other European countries that are just beyond the pale or beyond what we envisaged when this package was put together? At the end of the day this e-evidence package makes perfect sense. The notion that we would be delaying criminal prosecutions because of administrative difficulties in transferring e-evidence from one entity to another or across borders is nonsense. We should not tolerate that. We should not encourage it. We should be doing everything we can in a legislative context to avoid that happening. That is what this Bill does as I understand it. It does not mean that it is perfect. It does not mean that it is not worth looking at the possible pitfalls that we may have experienced in transposing similar applications of European legislation into national legislation. Has consideration been given to the possibility that one country might be very zealous - I will not say overzealous - in its pursuit of requests to addressees who might actually be resident in this jurisdiction? How will we deal with that? Is it sufficient for the CJICO or is it something that will require recourse to the Irish courts? If there is recourse to the Irish courts to solve those issues, what about the capacity of the courts to deal with those questions as they arise? We already have a criminal justice system and a court system generally that is under strain. We do not have enough judges. We do not have enough frequency of cases travelling through the courts. Will there be a dedicated court? Is that something that will create a blockage in the system? Has consideration been given to this? All of this comes back to the basic point of this. We are a small entity within the European Union. We have had a universally positive experience of being part of the European Union and we have benefited enormously from co-operation with other European Union states whether through international co-operation on criminal justice matters, trade, travel or the free movement of ideas, goods and services, and all of the principles that we have come to take for granted as being part of the European Union. These are all good things for us. I welcome the Bill from the point of view that it transposes the EU e-evidence package. It is important and it will benefit us. In the final analysis, our job in this House is to look at this Bill and the manner in which it transposes that package. Does it do it in a way that still serves us? More importantly, does it do it in a way that avoids pitfalls that will sometimes emerge from transposing complex legislation that is meant to apply to 27 states - hopefully in the near future more - by narrowing that into our jurisdiction and fitting it, like the peg that goes into a hole, into our specific common law jurisdiction. Does it work? Are there pitfalls and have all possible unintended consequences been considered? I am quite sure the Minister thinks they have but I would be very grateful to hear what specific considerations in that area have been given. Maidir leis an mBille féin, tá mé thar a bheith i bhfabhar an Bhille agus an mhéid a dhéanfaidh sé maidir leis an dlí agus an dlí Eorpach atá ag teacht go hÉirinn. Is maith an rud é. Is maith dúinn é mar mhuintir na hÉireann. Cuirim fáilte roimh an mBille agus tá súil agam go rachaidh sé trí Thithe an Oireachtais leis an luas céanna lenar tháinig sé go dtí an Teach seo.

I am glad to get the opportunity to speak. I welcome the introduction of this Bill which will ensure that electronic evidence needed for criminal investigations can be requested by law enforcement from service providers. What I am thinking about is the apprehension of drug lords who are ruining our society and causing so much mayhem in families. We see youngsters committing suicide and the disruption of families. As I said, the mayhem it causes is terrible. I support any way that we can apprehend these people rapidly because they have our society completely ruined. It is happening in most rural places, villages and towns, and of course our cities. The effect it is having on family life is desperate. In relation to international co-operation, is this only with countries within the European Union's jurisdiction? It needs to go further than that. We need to have the same co-operation with countries outside of the European Union. Every one of us here knows they are coming from every part of the world. My worry, as I have said to the Minister here before, is our exposure along our coast. In many places even Kerry, we no longer have Garda stations. I worry, and many people worry, that drugs are coming in along the shore at night when they know nobody is monitoring or knows what is going on. We need more surveillance for that reason alone. That is a very important reason. We know the existing means to get the electronic evidence needed for criminal investigation is slow and complex, and depends on the goodwill of service providers. When we are in the vein of apprehending criminals, we should not be impeded in any way. It should not be down to goodwill as to whether they give the evidence or not. It should be mandatory that they give it. I am just talking about drugs and the desperate situation that we have in our country at the present time. We know the Garda is doing very good work in apprehending big amounts of drugs but that only tells you the amounts that are getting through. The disruption caused and the harm they are doing to our youngsters is terrible. More and more cases depend on electronic evidence, so any improvements in this process is welcome if it ensures criminal investigations can be progressed in a timely manner. My concerns, however, relate to the total cost of implementing this and running it each year. So far, the financial implications amount to a budget allocation of €73,000 for pay costs in 2026. In the context of the costs we have today with other things, that is a minimal amount of funding. I do not know how that can be effective or adequate. A total of €3 million in capital expenditure has also been allocated for the building of an IT system necessary to connect to the EU decentralised IT system. I must make way for my colleague, Deputy Carol Nolan.

I wish to speak about the Criminal Justice (International Cooperation on Electronic Evidence and Other Matters) Bill 2026. It is a Bill that gives the State and the European Union sweeping new powers to obtain, preserve and transfer electronic evidence at extraordinary speed. I raise a simple question: why is the political will so strong in some areas but so weak in others? When it comes to digital surveillance and cross-border data demands, the State is prepared to move mountains. This Bill creates a system where Ireland becomes the central enforcement hub for the entire EU’s e-evidence regime. Matheson LLP, in a detailed legal analysis, warns that Ireland will face significant operational demands and, potentially, substantial volumes of foreign data production orders, all under extremely tight deadlines, sometimes as short as eight hours. The machinery can move quickly when Europe needs it to. The political will is there when the European Parliament calls. The urgency is there and the resources are being found. When we look at another area, however, such as the identification of individuals entering our State through the migration system, including those who may be wanted abroad for serious crimes, the urgency suddenly evaporates. We still do not have a fully effective identity verification system at our borders. We still have gaps in biometric checks and delays in information-sharing. We still have well-documented cases in the public domain where individuals wanted abroad have entered Ireland undetected. I ask again: why is the State prepared to build a high-speed, high-capacity surveillance compliance machine for the EU but not an equally robust system to protect our own borders and people? That question needs to be answered. This Bill will allow foreign authorities to obtain identifying data from Irish-based companies at speed. It will allow Ireland to process hundreds of thousands of requests every year. It will require gardaí and our courts to prioritise and bow down to these demands even though they are already stretched to the limit. However, when it comes to identifying individuals entering our State - individuals who may have no documentation, no verified identity and, in some cases, criminal histories abroad - we still rely on systems that are slow, inconsistent and, in many cases, simply not fit for purpose. That is the contrast that I wish to highlight here this evening. I do not seek to undermine any co-operation or policing. Rather, I ask why the political will is uneven and unbalanced. We can build a rapid-response, digital evidence system for Europe but we cannot build a rapid-response identity verification system for Ireland, which is a small island. Why is that? That is the question. We can enforce foreign data production orders within hours, but we cannot reliably confirm who is entering the State. We can impose major compliance burdens on Irish companies, but we cannot impose equivalent standards on the systems that protect our borders. I support international co-operation and effective and efficient policing, but I also support consistency, balance and, above all, common sense. If we are prepared to grant sweeping new powers in the digital sphere, then, surely, we must show the same determination in the physical world at our borders, in our migration system and in the basic task of knowing who exactly is entering this State. This is the contrast that I am raising here today. It is a contrast that deserves answers.

I am glad to take the close of this Second Stage debate on behalf of the Minister, Deputy O’Callaghan. I acknowledge with great thanks the engagement shown by all those present, particularly Deputies Mark Ward and Carol Nolan, in relation to today’s discussion on what is an extremely important Bill. The significance of Ireland’s active engagement in the EU’s e-evidence initiative, particularly as we progress towards Ireland’s looming Presidency of the Council of the European Union, is substantial. Ireland’s success in attracting industry at the forefront of technological innovation carries significant associated responsibilities. The nature of the services provided within the State by service providers has had many positive benefits for citizens across the European Union. However, the benefits of technology to our citizens can also prove beneficial to those who wish to cause harm or profit from crime. Fortunately, the usage of technological services can be logged and tracked, providing an avenue for the detection and prosecution of crime both within the State and across the European Union. I commend service providers for their active engagement on the implementation of the EU e-evidence package and their recognition that they can play an important role in addressing criminal activity. The office that will be established under this Bill will be a central hub for digital and judicial co-operation and will bring coherence, efficiency and expertise, enhancing Ireland’s role in the international judicial co-operation space. By investing in this office and centralising these responsibilities, we can ensure that Ireland speaks with one clear, expert voice in the EU and global regulatory forums. Ireland’s position as a technology hub for many of the larger service providers in the EU means the regulatory model we adopt will have significance beyond our shores. As a result, the office and its director established by this legislation will play an important role in the modernisation of evidence-gathering for criminal justice investigations throughout the European Union. The director and the office will have the critical task of ensuring service providers comply with lawful requests and that fundamental rights, data protection and privacy rights are upheld. This is not a small undertaking and it will require co-operation between service providers and judicial authorities alike. Service providers have dual obligations. They are both gatekeepers for their customers’ data and, potentially, if unwittingly, holders of information that may be crucial to criminal investigations. The various processes, procedures and safeguards outlined in both the e-evidence directive and regulation, together with those contained in the Bill, provide the means by which the director and the office will weigh these potentially competing interests. While the Government expects compliance from service providers, the Bill also provides for the imposition of potentially significant penalties for non-compliance with the requirements of either the directive or the regulation. The inclusion of the provision for an adjudication officer, in line with advice from the Office of the Attorney General, ensures that fair procedures with regard to the assessment of the validity or degree of fines imposed will be in place. I advise Deputies that the Minister, Deputy O’Callaghan, intends to speedily progress this Bill through the Houses, thus ensuring that Ireland is ready for the launch of the e-evidence regime on 18 August 2026. Committee Stage has already been arranged and the Minister looks forward to actively engaging with Deputies on the details of this Bill. While the Minister is prepared to consider suggested amendments, he advises Deputies that there is likely to be limited scope for their acceptance. The requirements imposed by both the directive and the regulation, as well as legal advices obtained by the Office of the Attorney General, limit what can be accommodated. However, the Minister, and the Government more widely, can ensure Deputies that progression of the Bill will send a positive signal to the Commission and member states that, as we take up the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, we recognise Ireland’s importance in ensuring the success of the EU e-evidence initiative and its objective.

The division will be taken immediately prior to Committee Stage of the Bill, which will be taken in committee of the whole Dáil on Wednesday, 17 June 2026.